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CONSTRUCTING THE FRANCHISE:
CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS VERSUS PRIVILEGES AND
THEIR CONCOMITANT POLICIES
Michelle D. Deardorff, Ph.D.*
1. INTRODUCTION
Access to the ballot has been a contentious issue in American politics
since our very founding as a nation,' and for good reason. In a representa-
tive democracy, those who are empowered to elect the officials who will
govern and rule are the very ones who determine which competing political
value will be the basis for public policy. Over time, the nation has ex-
tended the franchise to groups regardless of gender,2 race,3 national ori-
gin,4 native language,5 literacy,6 religion,7 and property status.' The
debates surrounding these decisions have been contentious and continue to
* Professor of Political Science and Head, Department of Political Science, Public
Administration, and Nonprofit Management, University of Tennessee at Chattanooga. I would like to
thank Professor Angela Mae Kupenda, Mississippi College School of Law, and Dr. Emilye Crosby,
Professor of History, SUNY Geneseo, for their thoughts on this idea, suggestions of examples, and
feedback on my argument. I would also like to thank the engaged audience and co-presenters at the
Mississippi College Law Review Symposium Readdressing the Voting Rights Act: Where is Our Nation
after Shelby County v. Holder?, whose thoughtful questions and trenchant analysis improved the
quality of this work. Thanks are also due to my former students and colleagues at Jackson State
University for helping me evaluate the dominant debate on voting and rights through a different
perspective, and for inspiring me to seek to alter the tenor of the debate for democracy's sake.
1. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN
THE UNITED STATES 363-67 (2000) (relating the evolution of the provision of suffrage throughout
American history).
2. See generally ELLEN CAROL DuBois, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1998);
ROSALYN TERBORG-PENN, AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE VOTE, 1850-1920
(1998); and MARY WALTON, A WOMAN'S CRUSADE: ALICE PAUL AND THE BATTLE FOR THE BALLOT
(2010).
3. See generally RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE Two RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR
BLACK ENFRANCHISEMENT (2004); CHRISTOPHER MALONE, BETWEEN FREEDOM AND BONDAGE:
RACE, PARTY, AND VOTING RIGHTS IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (2008) (analyzing the extension and
retraction of the right to vote to African Americans between the founding of the United States and the
Civil War); and Richard J. Timpone, The Voting Rights Act and Electoral Empowerment: The Case of
Mississippi, 78 Soc. ScI. Q. No.1 (Mar.) 177-85 (1997).
4. IAN HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (1996) (see spe-
cifically chapters 2 and 3, which examine how citizenship's construction by "whiteness" impacted the
determination of voting privileges for immigrants from differing national origins as our immigration
policy and domestic fears changed over time).
5. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 145, 260, 267; see Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
6. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 141-46.
7. Id. at 85-87; DAVID SEHAT, THE MYTH OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 27 (2011) (look-
ing at religious barrier to elections, civil rights, and enfranchisement based on religion).
8. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 340-48.
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be so well into the twenty-first century. 9 One reason for these battles is the
inherent conflict within American political thought over the relationship
between suffrage and citizenship.1"
This essay focuses on the current questions surrounding the issue of
access to the ballot through the lens of the debate as to whether voting is a
right or a privilege of citizenship. I suggest that we have at least two mod-
els of this relationship and that the arguments we have relative to voting
policies are actually over a deeper theoretical conflict over right versus
privilege. The construction of the franchise in the public debate has an
immense impact on the types of voting policies that seem appropriate to
the general public. A person who believes that voting is a right secured by
citizenship or residency in a democratic nation would argue that access to
the ballot is fundamental and should be strongly protected both by the
Constitution and through statutory law." For these individuals, any barrier
to the ballot-be it an identification card, complicated registration
processes, or the potential of losing the vote-is a badge of "second-class
citizenship" and a threat to democracy. 12 On the other hand, individuals
who assume that voting is a privilege, which only certain citizens should
exercise as a reward for their civic virtue or community investment, will
believe that barriers to the franchise are appropriate.' 3 These advocates
will support such policies as necessary to prevent potential fraud and to
ensure that only the most committed and well-informed individuals deter-
mine the nation's course.'
4
Using this framework of citizenship rights versus privileges, this essay
begins with an analysis of this conflict within American political thought
and with a definition of the competing positions. The second part of the
essay is a brief exploration of the historic legal and political efforts to ex-
tend the franchise to white women and people of color, examining the justi-
fications made on both sides of the debates. After the historic thesis has
been demonstrated, the essay will move to the current debates over key
voting issues, such as felony disenfranchisement and voting identification
policies. Arguments made in the current debates will be examined to see if
9. Andr6 Blais, et al., Deciding Who Has the Right to Vote: A Comparative Analysis of Election
Laws, 20 ELECTORAL STUD. (Mar.) 41-62 (2001).
10. Russell J. Dalton, Citizenship Norms and the Expansion of Political Participation, 56 POL.
STUD. (Mar.) 76-98 (2008); Naila Kabeer, Citizenship, Affiliation, and Exclusion: Perspectives from the
South, 33 IDS BULL. (Feb.) 1-15 (2002).
11. DuBois, supra note 2, at 30-42.
12. LANI GUNIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTA-
TIVE DEMOCRACY 35-37 (1991) ("The importance of this opportunity [the right to vote and elect repre-
sentatives] derives from fundamental assumptions about representative democracy: that the
government's authority depends on the consent of the governed and that the interests of those who are
bound by governmental actions cannot be arbitrarily ignored in the legislative proves. But, this notion
of 'opportunity' has been transformed into one of 'right' to empower a historically disenfranchised and
politically despised group. The most notable example of institutional vindication of this right is the
enactment of the Voting Rights Act.").
13. TERBORG-PENN, supra note 2, at 107-15.
14. See D.B. Gantz, Should All Voters be Allowed to Vote?, THE BLAZE, Feb. 14, 2014, www
.theblaze.comlcontributions/should-all-voters-be-allowed-to-vote/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).
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the same historic assumptions and values are reflected in the policy justifi-
cations. If the political values underlying these contentious policy issues
are revealed, the nation can begin debating the larger question of what is
the nature of the vote-privilege or right-as opposed to focusing on spe-
cific policies which appear to advance partisan agendas on both sides of the
aisle.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CITIZENSHIP AND THE FRANCHISE
Historically, few people at the beginning of our nation actually exer-
cised the right to vote.15 So, despite our inherent valuing of the right to
vote within a representational democracy, we exercised a principle called
"virtual representation."16 This approach to democracy authorized a privi-
leged individual, deemed "the citizen," to voice and protect the interests of
the people who reside within the sphere "he" controlled-his wife, chil-
dren, tenants, servants, employees, and slaves.' Only individuals who
passed specific requirements for citizenship, including at times age, prop-
erty, religious, race, and gender stipulations, were deemed citizens with
voting and representative powers.'" Behind this notion of virtual represen-
tation was the belief that these were the individuals with a financial invest-
ment and personal stake in the success of the new nation and as such they
were exercising their power wisely and sedately. 9 The fear of many was
that those without clear stakes in society, those without property or those
alienated by contemporary policies, would use the power of citizenship and
the right to vote to destroy the extant society and rebuild it in their own
image and interest.2" Those with education and the wisdom to rule disin-
terestedly, protecting the needs of the disenfranchised, could be trusted to
represent the community. While historically private property or military
service was seen as documenting personal independence, investment in the
political community, and dedication to the common good, and thereby nec-
essary for citizenship, these elements are no longer seen as currently neces-
sary.2' However, today we may create other proxies to represent this same
investment in society.
15. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 7 (estimating that despite wide variation among the colonies only
about 60% of white males could vote). The extension of the franchise for free blacks and property-
holding women varied widely among the states, but the general tendency was an increased restriction of
these rights after the Revolution, not an expansion. Id. at 54-60.
16. See Paul Langford, Property and "Virtual Representation" in Eighteenth-Century England, 31
HIST. J. 1, 83-115 (1988); see also Joan R. Gundersen, Independence, Citizenship, and the American
Revolution, 13 SIGNS 1, 59-77 (1987) (discussing how much of the scholarship on virtual representation
explores how the Founders dismissed this notion for themselves, but ignoring how other demographic
groups were dependent upon it).
17. LINDA KERBER, TOWARD AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF WOMEN 262 (1997).
18. Id. at 36-37.
19. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 7-12 (1991); see WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 165-66 [1765] (1978).
20. LINDA K. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC: INTELLECT AND IDEOLOGY IN REVOLUTION-
ARY AMERICA 36 (1980).
21. RICHARD BELLAMY, CITIZENSHIP: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 27, 54 (2008); SHKLAR,
supra note 19, at 45.
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Clearly, not all of those disregarded by this political structure of citizen
agreed.22 Early American history contains a clear record of the dispos-
sessed seeking to apply the universal values articulated in the Declaration
of Independence to themselves. For example, we have historical evidence
of enslaved individuals who, drawing on the language of the Declaration of
Independence and the philosophical claims inherent in the Lockean social
contract, petitioned state legislatures to claim their own freedom.23 Many
female writers of the Revolutionary Age assumed their capacity for politi-
cal thought and engagement,2 4 and later in the nineteenth century, land-
owning women refused the right to vote declined to pay taxes based on the
revolutionary maxim of "no taxation without representation.12
5
These two understandings of citizenship-one as a universal right that
should be generally guaranteed regardless of race, gender, religion, or
class, and the second which limits citizenship to those whom the power elite
trust to exercise their authority wisely because of prior demonstrations of
responsibility-have differing interpretations of the role of voting. The
first vision constructs citizenship in a manner that respects voting as an
inherent right all adult inhabitants possess.2 6 The second articulation de-
signs these attributes of citizenship to be a privilege, extended with caution
and limited to the responsible.2 7
It is in our understanding of voting that the tension between the two
constructions is most clear. As Richard Bellamy has stated,
22. We have a long history of dissent in our nation and dissent over exclusion from full citizen-
ship has long been protested. For instance, see the following poem in ALICE DUER MILLER, ARE
WOMEN PEOPLE? A BOOK OF RHYMES FOR SUFFRAGE TIMES (1915), in "BELONG TO THE WORLD":
WOMEN'S RIGHTS AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 181 (Sandra F. VanBurkleo, ed., 2001):
"Father, what is a legislature? / A Representative body elected by the people of the state. / Are women
people? / No, my son, criminals, lunatics, and women are not people. / Do legislators legislate for
nothing? / Oh, no; they are paid a salary. / By whom? / By the people. / Are women people? / Of course,
my son, just as much as men are."
23. In 1777, slaves submitted appeals before the Massachusetts legislature exhorting, "[y]our pe-
titioners apprehend that they have, in common with all other men, a natural and unalienable right to
that freedom, which the great Parent of the universe hath bestowed equally on all mankind, and which
they have never forfeited by any compact or agreement whatever. But they were unjustly dragged by
the cruel hand of power from their dearest friends ... to be sold like beasts of burden." Second Petition
of Massachusetts Slaves, in W. C. NELL, THE COLORED PATRIOTS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION,
WITH SKETCHES OF SEVERAL DISTINGUISHED COLORED PERSONS, available at http://www.docsouth.unc
.edu/neh/nell/nell.html#nel113 (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).
24. KERBER, WOMEN OF THE REPUBLIC, supra note 20, at 37-38, 276-77; KERBER, TOWARD AN
INTELLECTUAL HISTORY, supra note 17, at 292-93.
25. LINDA K. KERBER, Wherever You Find Taxey There Votey Will Be Also" Representation and
Taxes in the Nineteenth Century, in No CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: WOMEN AND THE OBLI-
GATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 81-123 (1998).
26. The right to vote in a democracy is necessary for political participation. "The way in which
political participation can be conceptualised [sic] as a right as well as an obligation underlines its impor-
tance to both liberal and republican traditions of citizenship. Together with civil rights, basic political
rights form the core of the liberal tradition, guaranteeing the 'negative' freedom on individuals in the
name of their autonomy[.]" RUTH LISTER, CITIZENSHIP: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 33 (1997).
27. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
TiE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 522-24 (1975) (noting how American citizenship was a move-
ment away from traditional republican citizenship to a more liberal construction, but still maintaining
the concern regarding personal interest as potentially destructive to the nation).
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Historically, citizenship has been linked to the privileges of
membership of a particular kind of political community-
one in which those who enjoy a certain status are entitled to
participate on an equal basis with their fellow citizens in
making the collective decisions that regulate social life. In
other words, citizenship has gone hand in hand with political
participation in some form of democracy-most especially,
the right to vote.28
As noted above, participation in government is understood as a central
part of citizenship in a democracy, but how voting relates to citizenship has
been debated. For those who see voting as a right of citizenship, the expan-
sion of the franchise is a prerequisite for full citizenship or "first-class citi-
zenship," as many in the modern civil rights movement labeled it.29 In a
representative democracy, those who cannot vote cannot engage in self-
governance and are therefore, by definition, oppressed. As Martin Luther
King, Jr. stated in his 1957 speech "Give Us the Ballot, We Will Transform
the South,"
So long as I do not firmly and irrevocably possess the right
to vote I do not possess myself. I cannot make up my
mind-it is made up for me. I cannot live as a democratic
citizen, observing the laws I have helped to enact-I can
only submit to the edict of others.3 °
For representatives of this perspective, barriers to voting are a denial of
basic citizenship. Because of the long, slow history of enfranchisement 3
and the numerous barriers historically placed before many groups to pre-
vent them from voting,3 2 it is hard for those who interpret voting as an
inherent right to not perceive these barriers as deliberate attempts to con-
trol both the direction of democracy and the outcome of the ballot.33
28. BELLAMY, supra note 21, at 1-2.
29. SHKLAR, supra note 19, at 17, 28-30.
30. Martin Luther King, Jr., Give Us the Ballot, We Will Transform the South (1957) (speech
given before the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial in Washington on
May 17, 1957), available at http://www.pbs.org/pov/pov2008/election/wvote/king.html (last visited Sept.
22, 2014).
31. For instance, the right to vote was constitutionally guaranteed to men regardless of race or
previous condition of servitude in the Fifteenth Amendment (1870) of the Constitution, but not en-
forced until the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1). Much litigation occurred in
the years after the passage of VRA to ensure access to the ballot for African-Americans and other
people of color. For women of all racial backgrounds, the right to vote was not extended universally
until the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment (1920) of the Constitution. The right to vote for citi-
zens between the ages of 18-20 was not extended until the passage of the Twenty-sixth Amendment in
1971.
32. In addition to simple state laws limiting the franchise to specific demographic barriers (age,
sex, race, property), techniques like poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather clauses, property qualifica-
tions, racial, or religious tests, and violence against potential voters were used as barriers. KEYSSAR,
supra note 1.
33. SHKLAR, supra note 19, at 14-17.
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On the other hand, those who define voting as a responsibility and
privilege of citizenship are concerned that those who do not exercise the
vote in a deliberate and thoughtful manner will take the nation down dan-
gerous paths.34 There has been a history of fear that huge influx of immi-
grants,35 newly freed people, 36 and uneducated women under the legal and
economic control of their husbands, will vote in dangerous ways. 37 Con-
trolling access to the ballot through linking this privilege to property, socie-
tal privilege, or literacy is a way of ensuring the status quo remains
protected. These arguments can be observed in an 1890 American govern-
ment textbook's articulation of why so many individuals believe the
franchise should not be expanded to
the great mass of ignorant voters, chiefly foreigners without
experience in self-government, with no comprehension of
American principles and traditions, and with little or no
property to suffer from excessive taxation. Such people will
naturally have slight compunctions about voting away other
people's money; indeed, they are apt to think that "the Gov-
ernment" has got Aladdin's lamp hidden away somewhere
in a burglar-proof safe, and could do pretty much everything
that is wanted, if it only would. In the hands of demagogues
such people may be dangerous, they are supposed to be es-
pecially accessible to humbug and bribes, and their votes
have no doubt been used to sustain and perpetuate most
flagrant abuses. We often hear it said that the only way to
get good government is to deprive such people of their votes
34. Shklar quotes Chancellor Kent of New York, as making the following argument, which dem-
onstrates this position: "The tendency of universal suffrage is to jeopardize the rights of property and
the principles of liberty ... there is a tendency in the poor to covet and to share the plunder of the rich
• . . there is a tendency in ambitious and wicked men to inflame these combustible materials. The
notion that every man that works a day on the road, or serves an idle hour in the militia is entitled as of
right to an equal participation in the whole power of government ... has no foundation in justice...
Society is an association for the protection of property as well as of life, and the individual who contrib-
utes only one cent to the common stock, ought not to have the same power and influence ... as he who
contributes a thousand." Id. at 50.
35. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 83-85.
36. CLAUDE G. BOWERS, THE TRAGIC ERA 14-17 (1929) (noting opposition to black voting
through mob violence and by the elite, he quotes General Sherman articulating a typical position, "My
belief is that to force the enfranchised negroes as 'loyal' voters on the South will produce new riot and
war and I fear Sumner, Wilson, and men of that school will force it on the government or prolong the
war ad infinitum .... My Army will not fight in that war. The slaves are free, but not yet voters.").
37. Francis Parkman, Some of the Reasons Against Woman Suffrage [1888], in THE STRUGGLE
FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTs 208 (George Klosko & Margaret G. Klosko, eds. 1999) ("If the better class of
women flatter themselves that they can control the others, they are doomed to disappointment. They
will be outvoted in their own kitchens, without reckoning the agglomerations of poverty, ignorance, and
vice, that form a startling proportion of our city populations. It is here that the male vote alone threat-
ens our system with its darkest perils. The female vote would enormously increase the evil, for it is
often more numerous, always more impulsive and less subject to reason, and almost always devoid of
the sense of responsibility .... Three fourths of them, when not urged by some pressing need or
contagious passion, would be moved, not by principles, but by personal predilections.").
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and limit the suffrage to persons who have some property at
stake.3 s
For proponents of this understanding of voting, there must be ways to en-
sure that those who vote are capable of rendering wise judgment and can
contribute to governance. So, for instance, in the early twentieth century,
many advocates of the expansion of the franchise still believed that an edu-
cational test of basic intelligence should be required of voters.39
III. HISTORICAL DISAGREEMENT SURROUNDING THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
THE VOTE: RIGHT VERSUS PRIVILEGE
A consequence of these competing understandings of the role of the
franchise is manifest in their interpretations of democracy. For those who
perceived the franchise as a right of citizenship, by necessity suffrage needs
to be expanded as broadly as possible to guarantee that all impacted by a
vote have the opportunity to cast a ballot. On the other hand, for those
who perceive the vote as a privilege to be exercised by the relatively few
who already have demonstrated their capacity to rule, the franchise should
be limited and narrowed. In our own history of suffrage expansion, we
have seen evidence of these perceptions and arguments. In this segment of
the essay, we will look at the debates surrounding the women's suffrage
movement and in the context of the passage of the Voting Rights Act of
1965.
A. Women's Suffrage
From its origination, the Constitution has provided limited protections
for women. It has been the Court's interpretation of the Constitution that
has evolved, rather than the explicit language of the text, allowing the ex-
pansion of basic citizenship protections to women. Although the original
document made general references to "persons" and "citizens" without
specifying gender, women of color and white women were generally not
included as part of the understood meaning.40 Two cases decided by the
United States Supreme Court soon after the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment quickly determined that the Constitution still did not protect
the rights of women. In 1873, the Court decided Bradwell v. Illinois,
4 1
holding the right to practice law was not connected to being a citizen of the
United States.42 Two years later, the Court in Minor v. Happersett43 made
it clear that citizenship does not necessarily mean the right to vote; the
38. JOHN FISKE, CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES CONSIDERED WITH SOME REFER-
ENCE TO ITS ORIGINS 133 (1890).
39. FRANK ABBOTT MAGRUDER, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT IN 1921: WITH A CONSIDERATION OF
THE PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRACY 361 (1921).
40. DAVID SCHULTZ, JOHN R. VILE, & MICHELLE D. DEARDORFF, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA, VOLUME II: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 559 (2010).
41. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873).
42. Id. at 130, 132-33, 139; DuBois, supra note 2, at 104-16.
43. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1875).
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Court argued that the Fourteenth Amendment only protected rights that
people already possessed, it did not create new ones.44 The Court believed
that states could extend additional citizenship rights to women, but the fed-
eral Constitution did not.45
Another case quickly followed the Bradwell decision in 1873. In these
circumstances, Susan B. Anthony was arrested and charged with the unlaw-
ful exercise of the vote.4 6 She argued that women could gain suffrage only
by claiming the right to vote and exerting it. The law under which she was
arrested had been written to prevent Southern whites from casting ballots
multiple times in a single election.4 7 Although she lost in the federal dis-
trict court and was fined, she was unable to appeal the case to the United
States Supreme Court because the judge would not imprison her upon her
refusal to pay the fine;48 consequently, she had no standing to appeal. This
case demonstrates the lack of civil rights that women possessed in court.4 9
For instance, the judge refused to allow Anthony to testify on her own
behalf. After the presentations to the all-male jury, Judge Ward Hunt took
out of his pocket a pre-prepared opinion in which he found her guilty.5"
Anthony did not challenge the established facts. She had voted. The pur-
pose of her trial was not to establish guilt, but to guarantee conformity to
the established order.51 This case is probably best remembered for the fa-
mous exchange that occurred between Judge Hunt and Anthony at the
time of her sentencing; it is in this exchange that we see Anthony clearly
articulate the rights discourse inherent in her understanding of suffrage.
The COURT: The prisoner will stand up. Has the prisoner
anything to say why sentence should not be pronounced?
Miss ANTHONY: Yes, your honor, I have many things to
say; for in your ordered verdict of guilty, you have trampled
underfoot every vital principle of our government. My natu-
ral rights, my civil rights, my political rights, are all alike
ignored. Robbed of the fundamental privilege of citizenship,
I am degraded from the status of a citizen to that of a sub-
ject; and not only myself individually, but all of my sex, are,
by your honor's verdict, doomed to political subjection
under this so-called Republican government.
44. Id. at 171; see N.E.H. HULL, THE WOMAN WHO DARED TO VOTE: THE TRIAL OF SUSAN B.
ANTHONY 23 (2012).
45. Michelle D. Deardorff, Women and the Constitution, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME
COURT 524-25 (David Schultz ed., 2005).
46. DuBois, supra note 2, at 129; HULL, supra note 44, at 101-02.
47. HULL, supra note 44, at 67-68, 123.
48. Id. at 177-78.
49. Id. at 130-59.
50. Id. at 149-50.
51. Id. at 155; DuBois, supra note 2, at 129.
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Judge HUNT: The Court can not listen to a rehearsal of ar-
guments the prisoner's counsel has already consumed three
hours in presenting.
Miss ANTHONY: May it please your honor, I am not argu-
ing the question, but simply stating the reasons why sen-
tence can not, in justice, be pronounced against me. Your
denial of my citizen's right to vote is the denial of my right
of consent as one of the governed, the denial of my right of
representation as one of the taxed, the denial of my right to
a trial by a jury of my peers as an offender against law,
therefore, the denial of my sacred rights to life, liberty,
property, and-
Judge HUNT: The court can not allow the prisoner to go on.
Miss ANTHONY: But your honor will not deny me this one
and only poor privilege of protest against this high-handed
outrage upon my citizen's rights. May it please the Court to
remember that since the day of my arrest last November,
this is the first time that either myself or any person of my
disfranchised class has been allowed a word of defense
before judge or jury-
Judge HUNT: The prisoner must sit down; the Court can
not allow it.
Miss ANTHONY: All my prosecutors, from the 8th Ward
corner grocery politician, who entered the complaint, to the
United States Marshal, Commissioner, District Attorney,
District Judge, your honor on the bench, not one is my peer,
but each and all are my political sovereigns; and had your
honor submitted my case to the jury, as was clearly your
duty, even then I should have had just cause of protest, for
not one of those men was my peer; but, native or foreign,
white or black, rich or poor, educated or ignorant, awake or
asleep, sober or drunk, each and every man of them was my
political superior; hence, in no sense, my peer. Even, under
such circumstances, a commoner of England, tried before a
jury of lords, would have far less cause to complain than
should I, a woman, tried before a jury of men. Even my
counsel, the Hon. Henry R. Selden, who has argued my
cause so ably, so earnestly, so unanswerably before your
honor, is my political sovereign. Precisely as no dis-
franchised person is entitled to sit upon a jury, and no wo-
man is entitled to the franchise, so, none but a regularly
admitted lawyer is allowed to practice in the courts, and no
2014]
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woman can gain admission to the bar-hence, jury, judge,
counsel, must all be of the superior class.
Judge HUNT: The Court must insist-the prisoner has been
tried according to the established forms of law.
Miss ANTHONY: Yes, your honor, but by forms of law all
made by men, interpreted by men, administered by men, in
favor of men, and against women; and hence, your honor's
ordered verdict of guilty, against a United States citizen for
the exercise of "that citizen's right to vote," simply because
that citizen was a woman and not a man.52
For Susan B. Anthony and similar advocates, virtual citizenship was an ex-
ercise of tyranny over a subjected class; only a rights-based form of citizen-
ship could transform an individual from subject to sovereign.
On the other hand, for those who disagreed and challenged the exten-
sion of the franchise for women, the focus was on the ways in which such
extension would damage the Republic and destroy the female character.53
The key concern for many was that women's independence from men in
the voting realm would make her self-reliant instead of dependent on the
citizenship of men.54 As articulated below by Senator J. B. Sanford, the
chairman of the Democratic Caucus of California in 1911, in stating his
opposition to female suffrage, this independence was not only unfeminine,
but threatening to the Republic.
Suffrage is not a right. It is a privilege that may or may not
be granted. Politics is no place for a women [sic] conse-
quently the privilege should not be granted to her. The men
are able to run the government and take care of the women.
Do women have to vote in order to receive the protection of
man? Why, men have gone to war, endured every privation
and death itself in defense of woman. To man, woman is the
dearest creature on earth, and there is no extreme to which
he would not go for his mother or sister. By keeping woman
in her exalted position man can be induced to do more for
her than he could by having her mix up in affairs that will
cause him to lose respect and regard for her. Woman does
not have to vote to secure her rights. Man will go to any
extreme to protect and elevate her now. As long as woman
is woman and keeps her place she will get more protection
and more consideration than man gets. When she abdicates
52. United States v. Susan B. Anthony (N.D.N.Y. 1873), excerpted in THE CONCISE HISTORY OF
WOMAN SUFFRAGE, Doc. 34, 293-96 (Mari Jo Buhle & Paul Buhle eds., 1978).
53. See the essays in the section Antis, in THE STRUGGLE FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS: THEORETICAL
AND HISTORICAL SOURCES 195-272 (George Klosko & Margaret G. Klosko eds., 1998).
54. DuBois, supra note 2, at 37.
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her throne she throws down the scepter of her power and
loses her influence.
Within this language, we hear a call back to the notion of virtual represen-
tation and the ideal that women can depend on men to accurately represent
her interests in policy and law. Instead of framing the discussion as if she is
not worthy of the privilege, this legislator perceives her of abandoning a
"higher" privilege of white womanhood5 6 to be protected, as long as she
keeps her place.57 This argument does not reflect any interest or implica-
tion for the right to vote for women of color, and it is here we see a contin-
uing danger of the privileges of citizenship model. As this model attempts
to maintain power in the hands of the few and elite worthy of citizenship,
maintaining the status quo, it may mask virulent assumptions of prejudice.
B. Voting Rights Act of 1965
After the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment, which extended the
right to vote to all males regardless of race or previous condition of servi-
tude, many states began to pursue their own means of limiting the
franchise.58 Within seven years of its passage, each Southern state's new
constitution removed or created grounds for eradicating the political rights
of its African-American citizens, including the right to vote.59 To preclude
federal constitutional protections from being implemented, new barriers to
55. J.B. SANFORD, ARGUMENT AGAINST SENATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT No. 8 (1911)
(filed in California State Archives under "Secretary of State Election Papers, 1911 Special Edition"),
available at http:// sfpl.org/pdftlibraries/main/sfhistory/suffrageagainst.pdf (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).
56. Because of the unique intersections of race and gender in the American polity, white women
and black women faced very different legal realities in terms of legal status; the combine institutions of
coverture and white supremacy (most obviously manifested through racialized slavery) resulted in a
differing legal statuses for white women and women of color (free and enslaved lack women and Native
American women). For discussions of these distinct statuses and experiences, consider as an introduc-
tion to this vast literature: PAULINE SCHLOESSER, THE FAIR SEX: WHITE WOMEN AND RACIAL PATRI-
ARCHY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 53-82 (2002); TERBORO-PENN, supra note 2 (discussing the
free women of color battle for the franchise at the turn of the twentieth century); JENNIFER L. MOR-
GAN, LABORING WOMEN: REPRODUCTION AND GENDER IN NEW WORLD SLAVERY (2004) (discussing
the unique experience of enslaved women).
57. This perspective on the "place" of white women has possibly most famously been stated by
Justice Bradley in his concurrence in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) in which he states, "the
civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and
destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupa-
tions of civil life. The Constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance
as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the
domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views which
belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a
distinct and independent career from that of her husband. So firmly fixed was this sentiment in the
founders of the common law that it became a maxim of that system of jurisprudence that a woman had
no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded as her head and representative in the
social state, and, notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status, many of the special rules
of law flowing from and dependent upon this cardinal principle still exist in full force in most states."
58. RICHARD M. VALELLY, THE Two RECONSTRUCTIONS: THE STRUGGLE FOR BLACK EN-
FRANCHISEMENT 121-48 (2004).
59. GARY MAY, BENDING TOWARD JUSTICE: THE VOTING RIGIrs ACT AND THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY xi (2013).
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the ballot were created by the states: literacy and comprehension tests, poll
taxes, and property qualifications. 6° The passage of "grandfather" clauses
insured that white males and their progeny who had been able to vote prior
to 1867 would be exempt from these barriers to voting, preserving histori-
cal privileges of citizenship. 6a As a Jackson, Mississippi newspaper argued,
"If every Negro in Mississippi was a graduate of Harvard, and had been
elected as class orator ... he would not be as well fitted to exercise the
right of suffrage as the Anglo-Saxon farm laborer . . . whose cross "X"
mark, like the broad arrow of Locksley, means force and intellect, and
manhood-virtus. '' 62 The purpose of these laws, according to a white Mis-
sissippi official in 1890, was "to invest permanently the powers of govern-
ment in the hands of the people who ought to have them-the white
people. '63 This approach ensured that African Americans in many South-
ern communities, and other dispossessed groups throughout the United
States, would not access the right to vote for 88 years, until the passage of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965, or its subsequent amendments.64
While the understanding of voting as a privilege frequently was a mask
for racism or sexism, some advocates argued that if such barriers applied
equally to all, they could enhance the value of the electorate and the
franchise. For instance, Booker T. Washington,65 in his 1903 "Statement on
Suffrage," contended,
As a rule, I believe in universal free suffrage, but I believe
that in the South we are confronted with peculiar conditions
that justify the protection of the ballot in many of the States,
for a while at least, either by an educational test, a property
test, or by both combined; but whatever tests are required
they should be made to apply with equal and exact justice to
both races.66
This type of equity in application was rarely documented.67
60. NEIL R. MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 38-
57 (1989).
61. CHARLES M. PAYNE, I'VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING TRADITION AND
THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE 26 (1995).
62. LEON LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 223
(1998).
63. Id. at 224.
64. Michelle D. Deardorff, Voting Rights Act of 1972, Voting Rights Act of 1975, and Voting
Rights Act of 1985, in CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES, Vol. II, 768-70 (Waldo E. Martin, Jr. &
Patricia Sullivan eds., 1999).
65. Booker T. Washington (1856-1915) was an African-American leader who worked closely
with white political leadership during Reconstruction and the early years of Jim Crow to ensure that
African-Americans had some basic economic opportunities. Simultaneously, he quietly helped fund
litigation to challenge state-level segregation laws. See Louis R. HARLAN, BOOKER T. WASHINGTON,
vols. I-I (1972, 1983).
66. Quoted in THE MODERN AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT READER: FROM DAVID
WALKER TO BARACK OBAMA 96 (Angela Jones ed., 2013).
67. See ELLEN CAROL DuBois, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN INDEPEN-
DENT WOMEN'S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA (1999); TERBERG-PENN, supra note 2; VALELLY, supra note 3;
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The Voting Rights Act of 1965 ("VRA") 68 was designed to strip from
the states the power to pass additional limitations on the franchise, such as
poll taxes and literacy tests. In section five of the Act, the Justice Depart-
ment was given the power to review, or preclear, any changes made by
states and counties to voting policies and procedures if that local or state
government had been identified as having a racially restrictive policy at the
time of the Voting Rights Act passage (the section of the law ruled uncon-
stitutional in the 2013 decision of Shelby County, Alabama v. Holder was
4(b), which articulated the criteria identifying those governmental enti-
ties). 69 From its very origins, section five had been one of the most contro-
versial portions of the law because of the intervention in arenas previously
controlled by the state.7 °
Justifications to prevent the passage of the VRA and its extension of
the franchise echo many of the values and concerns of those who had origi-
nally believed in virtual representation and who later recognize voting as a
privilege, not as a right of citizenship. If it is not a right of citizenship, then
it falls to local registrars, with their own cultural and individual biases and
prejudices, to determine who should have the privilege of voting.71 It is in
this shifting of authority that the racial denial of the ballot was allowed to
persist.72
In the debates around the extension of the protected voting rights to
African Americans, the language of rights versus privilege still echoed. Al-
len J. Ellender, Senator from Louisiana, noted during the heart of the de-
bate around the passage of the VRA that, "[t]he task of making it clear
that one is not against voting rights, but only in favor of maintaining voting
qualifications, is not always an easy one."7 3 As the tide on explicit white
supremacy turned at the bridge in Selma74 and at the Democratic National
and MCMILLEN, supra note 60 (all documenting the histories of the limiting of the franchise through a
wide variety of political and legal devices).
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1.
69. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
70. MAY, supra note 59, at 149-70.
71. GORDON A. MARTIN, JR., COUNT THEM ONE BY ONE: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS FIGHTING FOR
THE RIGHT TO VOTE 179-98 (2010).
72. This approach of limiting federal extension of rights through seeking local implementation is
limited to voting, but has been seen in other contexts. See e.g., IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE
ACrION WAS WHITE (2006) (discussing the implementation of key New Deal elements like the G.I. Bill
through local draft boards, thereby excluding the vast majority of southern black veterans from its
benefits).
73. KEITH M. FINLEY, DELAYING THE DREAM: SOUTHERN SENATORS AND THE FIGHT AGAINST
CIVIL RIGHTS 1938-1965 295 (2008).
74. Many scholars have noted that the violence reported by the national media when citizens
marched from Selma, Alabama towards Montgomery was a turning point in national public opinion
regarding the need or a federal voting rights enforcement statute. MAY, supra note 59, at 91-93.
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Convention in Atlantic City,75 the justifications surrounding voting began
to shift towards a rights-based narrative.76
Stokely Carmichael (later known as Kwami Touri), a civil rights ac-
tivist with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) in a
speech at Berkeley in 1966 clearly noted that for him and other activists
this right to the franchise is inherent within citizenship. He stated:
People ought to understand that: we were never fighting for
the right to integrate, we were fighting against white
supremacy. In order to understand white supremacy we
must dismiss the fallacious notion that white people can give
anybody his freedom. A man is born free. You may enslave
a man after he is born free, and that is in fact what this
country does. It enslaves blacks after they are born. The
only thing white people can do is stop denying black people
their freedom. I maintain that every civil rights bill in this
country was passed for white people, not for black peo-
ple .... I knew I could vote all the time and that it wasn't a
privilege but my right. Every time I tried I was shot, killed
or jailed, beaten or economically deprived. So someone had
to write a bill to tell white people, "When a black man
comes to vote, don't bother him." That bill was for white
people.77
In this speech, Carmichael not only defines voting as a basic citizenship
right, but explicitly challenges the privilege narrative of citizenship. In a
similar fashion, Bob Moses, another SNCC leader in Mississippi, empha-
sized registering for the vote the poorest blacks in one of the poorest re-
gions of the country. In the following discussion, he takes the privilege
argument and applies it to SNCC's voter registration activities in the Deep
South. He notes that those who use the idea that voting is a privilege are
not applying that idea equally among poor blacks and poor whites:
Now most of these people cannot read and write, and it
forced us to make another policy decision. Our position,
which we outlined to the Justice Department and which we
75. At the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party's 1964 challenge of the segregationist all-white
Mississippi delegation at the Democratic National Convention, Fannie Lou Hamer testified on national
television in primetime about her experience living in Mississippi as a sharecropper and being denied
the right to register to vote on the basis of her race. While no change was made in 1964, no subsequent
delegations could be segregated and the millions who heard Hamer's testimony heard of the violence of
voter suppression directly. Testimony of Fannie Lou Hamer Before the Credentials Committee of the
Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, Aug. 22, 1964, available at http:/ameri-
canradioworks.publicradio.org/features/sayitplain/flhamer.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2014); JOHN Drrr-
MER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN Mississippi 351-52 (1994).
76. FINLEY, supra note 73, at 287-89.
77. STOKELY CARMICHAEL, Berkeley Speech 1966, in JONES, supra note 66, at 275-76.
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are psychologically trying to sell to the Negro commu-
nity.., is that: 1) white people who are illiterate do vote in
almost every county in Mississippi; 2) most of these Negroes
have not had the opportunity to get a decent education, so
they have been denied equal protection under the laws
and... the strenuous literacy test should not apply to them;
3) the country owes them either the right to vote as a liter-
ate or the right to learn how to read and write now. It can-
not take the position that the illiterate cannot vote and still
have these people, who have been denied an education and
who express a desire to read and write, left illiterate; 4) we
feel that they know the people who govern their daily
lives-not only do they know them, in all probability they
knew their papas and mamas-so they know the people
who are running for office and whether this guy is a good
guy or going to beat them over the head."8
In these examples, we can see how the claim of citizenship privilege can be
used to mask virulent forms of racial and gender discrimination that our
nation has rejected, but it has an independent claim that when equitable
application of these barriers to the franchise result in no discernable bias, it
may result in a more limited but engaged electorate. It is also clear that the
argument that voting is a citizenship right with deep roots in our nation and
has been a competing narrative to virtual citizenship from our very begin-
nings. The question remains if this narrative structure will assist us in ana-
lyzing and discussing the current debates underscoring our understanding
of the franchise today.
IV. How THESE COMPETING MODELS OF CITIZENSHIP INFLUENCE
CURRENT DEBATES ON VOTING ACCESS
As demonstrated below, we have several current issues where the
question of access to voting and how broadly these rights should be con-
strued are discussed. One long-term limitation to voting has been the re-
striction of the franchise from those who are imprisoned or who are
convicted felons.79 A second area of recent debate has been the discussion
surrounding the necessity of voter identification being presented at the
election polls to prevent individual voter fraud.8" In both cases, the debate
is often heated and personal, with claims of racial and class bias being
78. JAMES FORMAN, THE MAKING OF BLACK REVOLUTIONARIES 305-06 (1972).
79. EARNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS (2013) (noting that currently 5.4 million Ameri-
cans are disenfranchised due to a felony conviction).
80. Gantz, supra note 14.
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presented,"' and concerns about the viability of democracy in light of cor-
rupt forces.82 This essay asks whether a more theoretical discussion of the
role of voting in citizenship can lead to a more productive debate.
A. Felony Disenfranchisement
One of the longest standing assumptions surrounding voting rights in
the United States has been the citizenship penalties that convicted felons
pay after the completion of their sentence.83 The Bill of Rights protects
them against cruel and unusual punishment,' and courts have found they
retain rights such as the free exercise of religion,8 5 albeit limited by the
legitimate interests of the state. As a privilege of citizenship, it has long
been assumed that the incarcerated forfeit voting opportunities in prison.86
The question of what rights are not restored once the penalty is paid and
the prisoner released, at least in terms of voting, has been given to the
states to determine.87
A study of the floor debate around the 233 state constitutional conven-
tions to determine if the explicit justifications for felony disenfranchise-
ment reveals that the most prominent justification for such policies was the
unfit character of felons to engage in the privilege of voting, as opposed to
punishing crimes or preventing people who were likely to commit election
fraud.8 8 As Frank P. Straus of the Kentucky convention of 1890-1891
argued,
the right to vote is a great right, and not only has the party
who exercises it an interest in it, but every man holds it as a
trust for the benefit of society at large; [therefore, if the]
gentlemen here want to protect the purity of the ballot, if
they want to throw safeguards around the exercise of this
great right, which everybody has an interest in-not only
the man who exercises it-we ought to establish it here as a
general proposition in the Constitution that no man who is
81. DRUCKER, supra note 79, at 138-39.
82. Those on one side of the issue are concerned about voter suppression and those on the oppo-
site side are concerned by voter fraud. See Republic State Leadership Committee, Democratic Misrep-
resentations on Voter Suppression, Sept. 17, 2013, http://www.rslc.gop/democratic-misrepresentations
onvotersuppression (last visited Sept. 22, 2014); but see John Wasik, Voter Fraud: A Massive, Anti-
Democratic Deception, FORBES, Nov. 6, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnwasik/2012/11/06/voter-
fraud-a-massive-anti-democratic-deception/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).
83. KEYSSAR, supra note 1, at 358-61 (Table A.7: Suffrage Exclusions for Criminal Offenses,
1790-1857).
84. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
85. Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 714, 719-20 (2005).
86. MAGRUDER, supra note 39, at 361.
87. Drucker, supra note 79, at 137 (noting that 48 states, all but Vermont, Maine, and Puerto
Rico, preclude the right to vote for all imprisoned felons and then have various regulations post-
incarceration).
88. John Dinan, The Adoption of Criminal Disenfranchisement Provisions in the United States:
Lessons from the State Constitutional Convention Debates, 19 J. POL'Y HIST. 3, 285 (2007).
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guilty of felony, who has been compelled to serve his time in
the State penitentiary, ought to be permitted to vote.89
Despite the clear articulation of voting privilege related to character test in
the majority of these disenfranchisement debates, racism was still a moti-
vating factor in many conventions. Mississippi, for instance, selected
crimes for which the convicted could be disenfranchised based on what of-
fenses the delegates to the constitutional convention believed blacks were
more likely to commit than whites; crimes like rape and murder, which
were believed to be equally committed by whites and blacks, were excluded
from the disenfranchisement laws until the 1960s. 90
In the current discussions surrounding felony disenfranchisement, can
it be that once again we move beyond the notion of voting being a right of
citizenship and instead find ourselves focusing on voting as a privilege of
citizenship, but a privilege that some have abdicated because of a felonious
past? We must exercise this intellectual position with caution, recognizing
the many ways in which we have allowed our narrow definitions of the
"worthy citizen" to serve as a mask for less virtuous purposes.
B. Voter Identification Laws
In more recent years, a new movement has emerged requiring state-
certified identification to allow citizens seeking to cast a ballot to demon-
strate their legitimacy.91 As with many of the arguments surrounding vot-
ing since the mid-twentieth century, a key concern has been the potential
impact of limiting citizenship rights, especially for people of color and the
poor. Comments by a few state-level Republican officials about how the
new voter identification laws would ensure victories for Republican candi-
dates have only heightened the rhetoric and the fear of disenfranchise-
ment.92 Currently, the debate has been between those in favor of
identification laws who warn against voter fraud9 3 and political scientists
89. Id. at 288.
90. Lynn Eisenberg, States as Laboratories for Federal Reform: Case Studies in Felon Disen-
franchisement Law, 15 N.Y.U.J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 539, 544-45 (2012).
91. Wendy Underhill, Voter Identification Requirements, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATORS, Mar. 26, 2014, http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voter-id.aspx (last
visited Sept. 22, 2014).
92. For instance, Republican House Majority Leader Mike Turza, in a speech before the Repub-
lican State Committee in June 2012, gave a list of legislative accomplishments by the Republican-led
legislature, stating, "Pro-Second Amendment? The Castle Doctrine, it's done. First pro-life legisla-
tion-abortion facility regulations-in 22 years, done. Voter ID, which is gonna allow Governor Rom-
ney to win the state of Pennsylvania, done." Kelly Cernetich, Turzai: Voter ID Law Means Romney
Can Win PA, http://www.politicspa.com/turzai-voter-id-law-means-romney-can-win-pa/37153/ (last vis-
ited Sept. 22, 2014). In another example, Don Yelton, Republican precinct chair in Buncombe County,
North Carolina stated he supported voter ID laws and other voting regulations because "the law is
going to kick the democrats in the butt." Interview by Jon Stewart with Don Yelton, The Daily Show,
Oct. 23, 2013, http://thedailyshow.cc.com/videos/dxhtvk/suppressing-the-vote (last visited Sept. 22,
2014).
93. John Fund, Voter Fraud: We've Got ProofIt's Easy, NATIONAL REVIEW, Jan. 12, 2014, http://
www.nationalreview.com/article/368234/voter-fraud-weve-got-proof-its-easy-john-fund/page/0/l (last
visited Sept. 22, 2014); see Kurt Hyde, True the Vote Releases Evidence of 173 Cases of Alleged Interstate
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and others who are unable to identify these cases of fraud warranting such
a policy, but find some evidence of voter suppression among the poor and
elderly who are disproportionately people of color.94 The discussion has
been unproductive as both sides dig in their heels, and with the discontinu-
ation of the pre-clearance requirements of the VRA based on the Shelby
County decision, these laws will continue to be implemented and the de-
bate as to their impact will continue unabated.
V. CONCLUSION
Within the recent Supreme Court decision surrounding the enforce-
ment of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby County, we can see hints of this
tension between voting as a privilege and voting as a right still emerging
from the discussion. For those who define voting as inherent to the defini-
tion of a citizen, the protection of the right for individuals to vote and for
communities to cooperate to make their voice heard must supersede or
preclude any other private interest, including the independence of the state
or an understanding of "states' rights." On the other hand, for those who
see voting as a privilege, it is a privilege the state monitors and controls,
albeit with the potential for abuse. For advocates of this perspective, the
authority of the state to control access to this privilege is central to protect-
ing the integrity of the vote, as well as to maintain the structure of
federalism.
If we return to the traditional notion of voting as a privilege of citizen-
ship, with those who have legislative power defining the privilege, the ques-
tion must be asked: what would be defined as the valued qualities of
citizenship?95 In light of the clear demographic change in the United
States, in which the attributes that had previously defined privilege in the
country (propertied, white males) now become a minority population,96 the
Voter Fraud, THE NEw AMERICAN, Aug. 15, 2013, http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/crime/item/
16313-true-the-vote-releases-evidence-of-173-cases-of-alleged-interstate-voter-fraud (last visited Sept.
22, 2014); see also Bubba Atkinson, This FACTUAL EVIDENCE of Voter Fraud in Ohio Should
Change Democrats' Minds About Voter ID, IJREvIEw, Dec. 2013, http://www.ijreview.com/2013/12/
104139-evidence-voter-fraud-ohio-change-democrats-minds-voter-id/ (last visited Apr. 6, 2014). In this
final essay, the language quoted from Fox News reporting that 17 individuals who were not citizens
voted in the 2012 presidential election is telling: "The alleged crime would be a notable case of voter
fraud in a key swing state. By law, only American citizens are allowed the privilege of casting ballots
for the nation's leaders." Id.
94. BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE, POLICY BRIEF ON PROOF OF CITIZENSHIP (2006), http://
www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download file 38263.pdf (last visited Sept. 22,
2014); Keith G. Bentele & Erin E. O'Brien, Jim Crow 2.0? Why States Consider and Adopt Restrictive
Voter Access Policies, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 4, 1088-1116 (2013); but consider M.V. Hood III & Charles S.
Bullock, III, Much Ado About Nothing? An Empirical Assessment of the Georgia Identification Statute,
12 ST. POL. AND POL'Y Q. 4, 394-414 (2012) (finding no racial bias to the suppression).
95. I would like to thank Professor Angela Kupenda of Mississippi College School of Law for
raising this intriguing question regarding white women at the initial presentation of this Keynote ad-
dress. I would also like to acknowledge Professor Kareem U. Crayton at the University of North Caro-
lina School of Law for suggesting the applicability of the Rawlsian veil of ignorance for this analysis.
96. William H. Frey, Shift to a Majority-Minority Population in the US Happening Faster than
Expected, BROOKINGS, June 19, 2013, bttp://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/06/19-US-
majority-minority-population-census-frey (last visited Sept. 22, 2014).
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question arises of who would be privileged in the future if we adopt this as
our model of citizenship. John Rawls, in his 1971 classic A Theory of Jus-
tice, raises this query when he asks: how would a new social contract that
attempts to maximize liberty and equality look? Rawls suggests the crea-
tion of a "veil of ignorance" behind which the creators of the new social
contract stand as they construct a new system of governance, which will
inevitably privilege some and harm others. He posits that these architects
should not know "his place in society, his class position[,] or social status,
nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and
abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like."97 The purpose of the veil
of ignorance is to ensure that any resulting values or principles decided by
the architects are fair and just. As Rawls states, "[s]omehow we must nul-
lify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt
them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage."98
If people determining the privilege of voting want to be certain that a
privilege is being asserted in a way that benefits democracy by allowing the
best voters to govern and not merely reinforce the powerful in retaining the
status quo, we must be careful in our articulation of what attributes will be
valued in voters. In Rawls' hypothetical schema, those who are making
decisions regarding power cannot know their own individual situation (in-
telligence, fortune, class position, race, gender) to ensure the subsequent
determinations are fair.
While these circumstances are impossible to replicate in society, the
coming demographic shifts should give us all pause in asserting what quali-
ties are essential for a legitimate voter. If we revert to voting as a privilege
model, not voting as a right model, we legitimatize the notion that those in
power determine who has a right-via the franchise-to determine policy,
representative government, and the direction of the nation. This means the
elite determine which voices to elevate and which to diminish. This may be
a comforting notion for those identifying with the power elite currently, but
may give pause in the fact that in many ways we are collectively behind a
metaphorical veil of ignorance, waiting to observe the political implications
of demographic change, as former majorities become statistical minorities.
As in many aspects of American political life, our discussions have become
polarized and fruitless. Instead of wrestling with the difficult concepts and
competing priorities facing America, we have instead resorted to name-
calling, fear, condescension, and sarcasm regarding policy choices. We no
longer debate the ideas at stake but instead assume those who disagree
with us are idiots.
How might this contested model of citizenship change the way we dis-
cuss and evaluate the notion of voting, barriers to voting, and protections
for voters, if we framed our dialogue differently? Maybe the real issue we
should be discussing is how we define the relationship between voting and
97. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12 (1971).
98. Id. at 136, 136-42.
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citizenship. If voting is a fundamental right, inherent to the notion of citi-
zenship, then there should be no barriers to participation. As a country
that values due process over crime control and tolerates guilty people going
free rather than risk the innocent being punished, a nation that values the
right to vote would tolerate the risk of fraud rather than prevent a legiti-
mate voter from being disenfranchised. On the other hand, if we believe
that voting is a privilege of citizenship that can only be practiced by those
that can be trusted by society to govern and protect all, then barriers to
participation are not only logical, but also necessary. However, adopters of
this position must recognize the historic threat to democracy within its
claims-the inherent support of the status quo and the contemporary
power structure as well as the danger that it can mask invidious forms of
prejudice and discrimination, concealed even from its own defenders.
